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Abstract
Background: For many decades, the debate on children’s competence to give informed consent in medical settings
concentrated on ethical and legal aspects, with little empirical underpinnings. Recently, data from empirical research
became available to advance the discussion. It was shown that children’s competence to consent to clinical research
could be accurately assessed by the modified MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical Research. Age limits
for children to be deemed competent to decide on research participation have been studied: generally children of
11.2 years and above were decision-making competent, while children of 9.6 years and younger were not. Age was
pointed out to be the key determining factor in children’s competence. In this article we reflect on policy implications
of these findings, considering legal, ethical, developmental and clinical perspectives.
Discussion: Although assessment of children’s competence has a normative character, ethics, law and clinical practice
can benefit from research data. The findings may help to do justice to the capacities children possess and challenges
they may face when deciding about treatment and research options. We discuss advantages and drawbacks of
standardized competence assessment in children on a case-by-case basis compared to application of a fixed age limit,
and conclude that a selective implementation of case-by-case competence assessment in specific populations is
preferable. We recommend the implementation of age limits based on empirical evidence. Furthermore, we elaborate
on a suitable model for informed consent involving children and parents that would do justice to developmental
aspects of children and the specific characteristics of the parent-child dyad.
Summary: Previous research outcomes showed that children’s medical decision-making capacities could be
operationalized into a standardized assessment instrument. Recommendations for policies include a dual consent
procedure, including both child as well as parents, for children from the age of 12 until they reach majority. For
children between 10 and 12 years of age, and in case of children older than 12 years in special research populations of
mentally compromised patients, we suggest a case-by-case assessment of children’s competence to consent. Since
such a dual consent procedure is fundamentally different from a procedure of parental permission and child assent,
and would imply a considerable shift regarding some current legislations, practical implications are elaborated.
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Background
In clinical practice an accurate assessment of children’s
decision-making capacities is needed to avoid two pit-
falls: to impose complex medical decisions on children
who are unable to make them, and to inadvertently
exclude capable children who want to take part in
decision-making [1]. For many decades, the debate on
children’s competence to give informed consent or
assent in medical settings concentrated around ethical
and legal aspects, with little empirical underpinnings [2].
Generally speaking, the term decision-making capacity is
used to describe different levels of patients’ abilities, and
the term competence refers to the degree of capacity
that is sufficient to allow patients to make an autono-
mous medical decision [3]. We will apply this termin-
ology in this article. Furthermore, when we indicate
competence to consent, we also consider competence to
refuse or dissent. Child assent refers to affirmative agree-
ment of a minor who is to take part in the informed
consent procedure in a way adapted to his or her cap-
abilities, while their legal representative has the formal
role of consenting [4].
In clinical practice many questions remained un-
answered, for example which age span to evaluate, how
to study the full range of abilities relevant to children’s
decision-making described in the literature, how to as-
sess decision-making capacities regarding different types
of medical decisions, and how to objectively assess chil-
dren’s competence. Progress was hard to achieve in
debates on the subject and the lack of consensus on chil-
dren’s competence to consent was reflected by the re-
stricted clinical implementation of the concept. There
was a gap between recommendations regarding policies
for children’s involvement in the consent procedure and
what had been documented in scientific research about
children’s competence assessment. The empirical approach
emerged as a designated way to examine the dilemmas.
Recently, objective data stemming from empirical
research on children’s competence to consent became
available, offering an opportunity to further the dis-
cussion. An earlier study conducted by the authors
demonstrated in a sample of 161 pediatric patients
that children’s decision-making capacities regarding
clinical research could be assessed in a valid and reli-
able way by means of an instrument, the modified
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical
Research (MacCAT-CR) [5]. The MacCAT-CR is a
semistructured interview format developed by Appelbaum
and Grisso in 2001, which measures the four aspects of
decision-making capacities that reflect the standards for
competence in most jurisdictions (understanding the
disclosed information about the nature and procedures of
the research; reasoning in the process of deciding about
participation; appreciation of the effects of research
participation on the patient’s own situation; and express-
ing a choice about participation) [6]. In the same study,
the four domains representing competence in most juris-
dictions (understanding, appreciation, reasoning and ex-
pressing a choice) appeared to constitute a single trait or
continuum of competence in children, which allowed for
estimating a cutoff score on MacCAT-CR above which
competence was likely. This is in contrast with adult lit-
erature, stating that scores on subscales need to be
weighted independently, and that failure in one domain
could translate into an incompetent assessment [3]. In
adults, because of this presumption, dimensionality was
never tested.
Age limits for children to be deemed competent to
decide on research participation were estimated: chil-
dren of 11.2 years and above generally appeared to be
competent, while children of 9.6 years and younger were
not. Children between 9.6 and 11.2 years were in a transi-
tion period; they develop important capacities but their
maturity is not pervasive [5]. Furthermore age turned out
to be the factor that explains most of the variance in chil-
dren’s competence to consent, followed by intelligence.
Theoretical assumptions that risk and complexity of the
decision would be related to a competence classification
could not be confirmed with empirical data [7]. This dem-
onstrated that more radical decisions, requiring a higher
level of competence, could possibly be made by children
as young as the group of children who were able to make
lower impact decisions. An explanation might be that chil-
dren at a certain age have the required capacities, and
competent decision-making is possible when information
provision is of good quality. For other potential determin-
ing factors for competence, like gender, systemic influ-
ences, disease experience, ethnicity and socio-economic
status, no clear relationship with a competence classifica-
tion could be demonstrated either. Interestingly, parents
appeared to judge their child more readily competent than
experts would [7].
Obviously, research on competence to consent to re-
search in children must be extended, and the next indi-
cated step is to test if the model produced from this
initial research can be replicated in a testing dataset.
Bearing this in mind, we will start to consider the mean-
ing of these recent empirical findings in view of their
context. Since the age limits for asking children’s con-
sent stated in many jurisdictions do not coincide with
those demonstrated in our research [5], we need to
evaluate whether it would be advisable to reset local
statutory age-limits. Having the possibility to assess chil-
dren’s competence individually in a standardized way, an
alternative option (namely to let go of rigid age limits
for alleged competence and switch to a case-by-case as-
sessment) might be considered. For example, now that it
is possible to establish a very intelligent eight-year old
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boy’s decision-making capacities, we need to consider if it
would be judicious to do so and if decision-making com-
petent, to allow him to give informed consent. Although
the assessment instrument proved to be accurate, there
might be possible drawbacks of the normative classifica-
tion of children into groups of competent and incompe-
tent ones. Overall, we should evaluate whether the clinical
assessment of children’s competence by an instrument is
comprehensive, or that we miss out on important non-
measurable factors. Finally, we need to consider if we are
fully aware of the influence of developmental aspects
affecting children’s competence, and if this makes chil-
dren’s competence different from adults.
In this article we will reflect on possible implications
of the recent empirical findings on children’s compe-
tence to consent considering normative, developmental,




Considering children either competent or incompetent
is a normative judgment. However, the fact that compe-
tence is a normative judgment does not mean that it
cannot be informed by research data. Research shows
that a competence assessment can be reliably performed
using a structured tool like the MacCAT-CR. The
MacCAT-CR’s total and sub-scores showed a good re-
producibility and the overall accuracy of MacCAT-CR
scores in correctly classifying children as competent
against the reference standard was high as well [5]. In
addition, it was shown that using such a tool, three age
groups could be distinguished: one in which children are
most probably incompetent, one in which children are
most probably competent, and a group in which prob-
ability of (in) competence is less clear (between 9.6 and
11.2 years). Such findings do not prescribe how ethics
and law should deal with (in) competence and children.
But, as we will discuss below, the findings may help to
do justice to the capacities children possess and chal-
lenges they may face when deciding about treatment and
research options. For instance, for health care profes-
sionals, as well as parents, it is important to know that a
structured and reliable tool for assessing competence in
children is available. Performing such a structured com-
petence assessment may clarify the capacities of an indi-
vidual child in case professionals have doubt about the
child’s competence. In addition, the findings concerning
the age groups may support the development of guide-
lines dealing with informed consent in children. Still,
clearly, the ethical and legal norm for competence in
children cannot be directly derived from these research
findings. For instance, establishment of cutoff scores for
competence is after all based on normative judgments.
Ethical aspects
Rational reasons versus emotions and values
Some authors have raised doubts about the validity of
competence assessment by MacCAT-scales, and argued
that the MacCAT-assessment puts the main emphasis
on rational reasoning. Ethicists and other commentators
bring into the discussion the role of values and emotions
in competence. Hope and colleagues [8] suggest that to
develop a better understanding of competence, research
needs to be expanded by factors of competences not
covered by the four criteria that are commonly applied
(understanding, appreciation, reasoning, expressing a
choice). Charland argues that MacCAT-scales seldom
sufficiently recognize emotive components and values in
decision-making competence [9]. He states that “patho-
logical values” may be present in patients with specific
psychiatric disorders that effect competence. He pro-
poses to incorporate a measure of emotional compe-
tence into a competence assessment instrument before
considering it a valid measure. Appelbaum, author of
MacCAT-T, agrees that emotions aid humans in process-
ing information but suggests that the feasibility of add-
ing emotional capacity to the list of capacities essential
for decisional competence should be demonstrated first
[10]. No consensus in this debate has been reached yet.
Furthermore, children may differ from adults by not
having developed yet stable long term goals and values
in life, meaning that children may procedurally be classi-
fied as competent although their decisions are based on
values that might change. This could imply that later on
they might regret decisions based on those early-life
values. It is conceivable that in children “immature
values” might be present that are not covered by compe-
tence assessment using MacCAT-scales. The study on
accuracy of MacCAT-CR in children was performed
using a reference standard established by experts. In
cases of psychiatric disorders the pathological values
might be recognized by clinical experts, in children we
might expect the clinical experts to have recognized
immature values when present in children. If not, the
study might have missed out on an unmeasured compo-
nent of children’s competence. This would then have
resulted in considering more children competent using
the MacCAT-CR than actually justified.
Legal aspects
Age-limits versus case-by-case assessment
It is widely recognized that the evolving abilities of chil-
dren and adolescents are reflected by a gradual develop-
ment of decision-making capacities [2]. The use of a
fixed age-limit as cutoff for competence is defendable,
knowing that age is an efficient indicator of competence
with considerable practical advantages as an administra-
tive and normative gauge. It can be measured easily and
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offers a clear framework. However, the disadvantage of
fixed age-limits is the all or nothing character, meaning
that relevant differences between individuals are not
taken into account. With a set age-limit, some incompe-
tent individuals above the limit will unjustly be deemed
competent and some competent individuals below the
limit unjustly deemed incompetent.
An alternative for the fixed age-limit is a case-by-case
assessment of decision-making competence. A recent
study has shown that doctors and researchers tend to
judge a child to be competent if the child’s decision con-
forms to their own ideas of the child’s best interest [11].
This means that competence is gauged by the outcome
of the decision rather than by the process of reasoning
in deciding about participation. Data suggest that un-
structured performance of competence assessments is
often sub-optimal and hence the reliability of unstruc-
tured judgments has been poor [12]. To avoid this bias,
a case-by-case assessment would require an objective
assessment instead of the currently used intuitive one.
The MacCAT-CR would be an appropriate instrument
for this purpose in the research context [5].
Reset age-limits
Age-limits for asking children’s consent vary widely over
nations and states [5]. In Europe, domestic law deter-
mines whether or not people are competent to consent
to healthcare interventions [13]. In some countries au-
tonomous decision-making is lawful only from 18 years
onwards and in other countries minors are allowed to
take healthcare decisions from a fixed age below legal
majority, e.g., 12 years in the Netherlands and 15 years
in Denmark [13]. Another variant applied in most
Canadian provinces and Switzerland is a flexible system
stating that anyone who is capable can give informed
consent, whereby competence is evaluated on a case-by-
case basis [13]. In the United States, generally speaking,
it often falls to parents or legal guardians to provide
informed permission for medical decisions and children
under 18 are to give assent [14]. Ideally, age-limits ac-
complish the goal of striking a proper balance in order
to both protect children's interests when they are not
fully able to do so themselves and to respect their auton-
omy when they can exercise it. So if a fixed age-limit is
used, it must be generally in accordance with the devel-
opmental stages. Earlier studies conducted by the au-
thors now offer scientific input for setting a reasonable
and just age-limit; as far as we currently know the age-
limit that presents closest accordance with children’s
competence is eleven or twelve years.
Best interest
Clearly, the duty to protect the best interests of the child
(see UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art 3) is
also relevant in this context. Although we will not go
into the (legal) details of this article, we would like to
offer the following line of reasoning: If a child possesses
all the required decision-making capacities which means
that it understands the relevant information, is able to
appreciate the consequences of the decision, capable of
reasoning and of expressing a choice, in other words if a
child is considered competent to give informed consent,
that would mean that a child is capable of acting in its
best interest. Children who are not decision-making
competent yet, should not be burdened with the re-
sponsibility for decisions they are not able to make
autonomously. Others should then decide in their
best interests.
Developmental aspects
Difference between competence assessment in adults and
children
In adults, patients are deemed competent unless the
clinician has reasons to believe otherwise. In children, it
is generally the other way around, they are presumed
not to be competent in most jurisdictions [14]. Whereas
in adults MacCAT-scales are merely used to ascertain
incompetence in mentally compromised patients out
of an overall competent population, in children it might
be more important to recognize competent patients
in a mainly incompetent population. The application
of MacCAT-scales in children puts higher demands
on the specificity of the instrument; it serves to weed out
the proportion of children that are correctly identified as
competent from those (possibly incorrectly) identified as
incompetent. In the MacCAT-CR study, specificity in
children of 11.2 years and older was good: 90 % [5].
Parent versus professional
Research showed that judgments of incompetence by
parents frequently coincided with the MacCAT-CR in-
competent classification, however parents’ assessments
of competence showed only moderate agreement with
the MacCAT-CR standard. This might imply that par-
ents express a higher expectation regarding their chil-
dren’s competence, assigning them more voice and
responsibility, than professionals do. In literature the op-
posite was described: in a sample of 120 young people
undergoing orthopedic surgery in 1993, health profes-
sionals recommended a much lower mean age for com-
petence than parents did (10.3 vs. 13.9) [15]. The recent
finding that parents judged their children more readily
competent than clinicians, might be related to the spe-
cific dynamics of parent-child relationships [16]. Good
parents are expected to inhibit their child’s impulsive,
risky, and sometimes harmful behavior. They substitute
the child’s ineptitude and inability to judge situations
with their superior judgment. Parents tailor their
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parenting behavior to the specific abilities of the child.
Children who are raised in a warm and understanding
atmosphere are often able to present their part in a joint
decision-making process at an early stage of their devel-
opment [17]. An authoritative parenting style, which
includes direction-giving and limit-setting, is positively
related with an adolescent’s capacity for autonomous
decision-making [18]. In the medical context children
might be capable of autonomous decision-making, albeit,
within the guiding environment set by their parents. Pos-
sibly parents assign their children more decision-making
competence than professionals do, because parents shape
the family context and professionals regard the child more
independently.
Assessment must cover developmental aspects
Differences between children and adults regarding
decision-making competence have been found in the
ability to restrain impulsivity and in the ability to place a
given decision in a larger temporal context [19]. The in-
adequate capacity of children in risk assessment could
be connected to the late full maturation of the frontal
lobes that are essential for effective executive functions
[18]. In addition, research shows that adolescents gener-
ally do not fully possess the capacity to appreciate the
long-term consequences of their choices until the age of
21 [18]. Research demonstrated a difference between
decision-making under low levels of arousal or in situa-
tions with low emotional upheaval (cold cognition), and
thought processes under high levels of arousal and emo-
tional valance (hot cognition) [20]. Hot cognition may
result in intuitive responses rather than carefully consid-
ered, rational responses [20]. Decisions on clinical research
participation involving information provision, rehearsal of
information, time to consider, and reflection with parents,
generally result in cold cognition decisions. Treatment
decisions are more prone to hot cognition when involving
time pressure or weighty risks. With the research results
showing that children of 11.2 years and above have com-
parable decision-making capacities to adults concerning
research participation, clearly normative aspects play a
role in the assessment of when their decision-making
competence was good enough. The developmental pro-
gress as described above, is expected to further improve
children’s decision-making competence with age, so at
11.2 years it is supposedly not as good as it can get. Fur-
thermore, we need to consider children’s possible imma-
turity in decisions of a supervisory or managerial nature
normally made by their parents, for example overseeing
the family agenda, or arranging transport to the hospital.
Possibly, children are able to decide with cold cognition
on research participation, but are less able to responsibly
respond to, for example, unforeseen traffic situations or
stressful peer-interactions. Therefore they still need the
dyadic relationship with parents who provide the neces-
sary direction-giving and limit-setting.
Recommendations and practical aspects
Considering the before-mentioned new empirical find-
ings on children’s competence to consent, the normative,
ethical, developmental, and clinical perspectives, we will
now envisage some recommendations which we de-
duced. From a practical point of view, assessment of all
pediatric patients’ competence on a case-by-case basis
with an instrument would impose a heavy burden on pa-
tients, professionals, and the medical system. A selective
implementation of a standardized competence assess-
ment in exceptional cases would be preferable over a
broad implementation.
For the research context, under the age of 9.6 years
children were generally incompetent to decide on re-
search participation [5], so an individual assessment does
not seem profitable. Children between 9.6 and 11.2 years
were in the change-over period, an individual assessment
of competence might be applicable in this age group.
Children of 11.2 years and above can generally be con-
sidered decision-making competent, and although they
need a supportive context, no individual assessment is
needed. In special research populations where there are
reasons to doubt children’s decision-making capacities
(e.g. intellectual disabled children or pediatric patients
with a psychiatric disorder that diminishes competence),
a research protocol could include a standardized compe-
tence assessment of participants. In these cases an as-
sessment could prevent incompetent patients from the
unjustified burden of decision-making responsibility.
In the treatment context, there are no conclusive
age-limits for competence established empirically. The
MacCAT-T is an instrument for assessing patient’s
competence to consent in a treatment setting, measuring
the same four aspects of decision-making capacities as the
MacCAT-CR. In a pilot study, use of the MacCAT-T
proved feasible in a population of children between 8 and
17 years of age who had to decide on predictive genetic
testing for cardiac diseases [21]. Although sample-size was
small (N = 17) and conclusions premature, all participating
children above the age of 12 years were judged to be com-
petent to decide on this treatment option. We suggest that
it may be valuable to create the possibility for clinicians to
take into account exceptional cases, such as the assess-
ment of a child under the age of 12, seemingly competent,
who has to make a weighty decision. In such cases an
individual standardized competence assessment could
underpin the exception to the rule.
Parents are generally provided with the legal authority
to raise their children, assigning them rights and respon-
sibilities. In some circumstances a legal representative or
guardian will carry this role as opposed to parents, in
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this article we will include them as we speak of parents.
To achieve a balanced consideration between the legal
position of the child and that of the parents, a dual con-
sent procedure (child and parent) is recommended for
minors from the age of 12 until the age they are allo-
cated rights for independent consent. Even if we estab-
lish a child’s decision-making competence regarding the
medical decision at hand, a dual consent procedure will
do justice to developmental aspects of children and the
specific characteristics of the parent-child dyad. The par-
ental role is needed to offer extra protection by creating
the context for the child’s competent decision-making
and by facilitating the child’s long term autonomy.
Besides the advantages of a dual consent procedure,
there may be a disadvantage concerning possible dis-
agreement between child and parent, which may require
elaborated policies. In the Dutch situation experience
has been gained with a dual consent procedure and
evaluation shows that disagreement between parent and
child was not a concern [22, 23]. In case of disagree-
ment, all efforts must be made to reach agreement. In
some exceptional cases of disagreement, Dutch law
allows for carrying through the decision of a competent
child above the age of 12 when it can prevent serious
harm. This could also be the case if restraining from
diagnostic testing would imply a loss of important treat-
ment possibilities.
Practically, a dual consent procedure would imply that
the patient information form would need to consist of two
separate versions, one for the parents and one for the child,
each followed by an informed consent form to be signed.
A dual consent procedure is fundamentally different
from a procedure of parental permission and child
assent, and would imply a considerable shift regarding
some current legislations, for instance within the EU
context [2]. Likewise, in the current Code for Federal
regulations of the United States [4] by definition chil-
dren are “persons who have not attained the legal age
for consent to treatments or procedures involved in the
research” (45CRF46.402 (a)). The legal age of adulthood
is a matter of local law, but is in a large majority of
states 18 years. Regulations state that some children
might be able to give their assent, meaning an affirma-
tive agreement. However, in research the institutional re-
view board may still waive the assent requirement under
certain circumstances (45 CFR 46.116). Some authors
have proposed that children’s assent should only be re-
quired from a fixed age of 14 years, based on theories of
subject autonomy and child development [24]. The em-
pirical evidence that children are generally competent
not only to assent, but even to give consent from the
age of 12 contradicts these regulations and theories.
There is no indication of a considerable difference in
children’s development between regions with widely
varying policies regarding children’s consent. These local
variations in regulations may have evolved under the in-
fluence of historical, cultural, or emotional preferences,
representing a local normative view. Empirical data now
provide underpinnings for more evidence-based age
limits in policies.
Limitations and directions for future research
Although our previous empirical research provides sub-
stantial data to consider in debate and practice, many as-
pects of children’s decision-making competence are still
to be studied, of which we will name just a few. For in-
stance, regarding medical decision-making, the age
limits for reaching legal majority vary between countries
and states from 16 to 21 years. Research does not show
at what age a dual consent procedure will no longer
prove effective. In addition, more research is needed to
demonstrate the validity of a cutoff score on a standard-
ized assessment instrument for competence and the
desirability of such a cutoff must be considered. In the
treatment setting, more extended research on reliability
and validity of the MacCAT-T in children is recom-
mended. The importance of children’s decision-making
competence is not confined to the medical context alone
but may be of significance to adjacent fields, for instance
children’s competence to proceed to criminal adjudica-
tion or to be consulted in civil procedures, which re-
quires further research. Furthermore, new developments
in neuropsychiatry may contribute to the understanding
of the functioning of specific brain regions or connec-
tions that promote competent decision-making.
Summary
Research outcomes show that the legal concept of medical
decision-making competence could be operationalized
into a standardized assessment instrument for children in
the clinical context. The MacCAT-CR proved accurate for
children’s competence assessment in clinical research.
Developmental aspects, especially the fine-tuning of
decision-making within the parent-child dyad, including
the broader family context, are of importance in addition
to a standardized competence assessment.
Policy recommendations include a selective implemen-
tation of individual assessment of children’s competence
in medical decision-making by a standardized tool in
combination with practicable, generally appropriate age-
limits. In the research context children can be deemed
competent from the age of 12 and above, and a case-by-
case assessment of competence might be valuable in
children in the change-over period between 10 and 12,
and in case of children older than 12 years when there are
reasons to doubt their competence for instance because of
mental disabilities. In the treatment context, individual
competence assessment might create an opportunity in
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exceptional cases to allow a competent child under the
age of 12 to co-decide over significant medical interven-
tions. A dual consent procedure, including both child as
well as parents, is recommended for children from the age
of 12 until they reach majority.
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